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October 2002: Vol. 32, 1 &2.) 
  
“Since Individual Psychology is not interested in the verbal expression of 
feelings, but only in the intensity of the movement by which they are 
expressed, it will evaluate the members of various religions not by the way 
they represent their feelings, but by the movement of the whole individual 
follower, i.e. by their fruits. That these fruits must be recognised sub specie 
aeternitatis may be said parenthetically. Individual Psychology does not 
deny that the religions with their powers, their church institutions, their 
influence on school and education, have a strong advantage. It will be 
satisfied in the practical application of its science to protect and further the 
sacred good of ‘brotherly love where the religions have lost their 
influence’” (Alfred Adler). 1 
  
Existentialism: A philosophical current started in the past century by the 
Dane, Søren Kierkegaard, and developed by recent scholars (Heidegger, 
Jaspers, Marcel, Abbagnano) in a variety of interpretations and 
connotations. For Kierkegaard (a Protestant) the tragic discovery of this 
real existence resolves itself in an appeal to the supernatural and, what is 
more, to an appeal without further ado to Christianity; but the other 
existentialists have eliminated this religious motive in order to stand aside 
in the problematicity of life and thought, and be free from the worries of 
definitive solutions. (Emphasis in original) 2 
  
This essay has several aims. First, it intends to show that Adler was a 
product of one of the philosophical systems of the time, namely, German 
existentialism. Slavik (1997) discusses the existential aspect of Adler’s 
thinking as a “contextual philosophy.” Such contextual philosophy is 
determined by the events constituting the individual’s life. Second, 
phenomenological philosophy throws light on Adler’s Individual 
Psychology and this takes his work out of its German context as it 
addresses itself to individual experience. Third, the religious roots of 
existentialism are a strength, not a liability, in understanding the human 




Jellema (1963) wrote that we are witnessing “the emergence of a new 
‘mind,’ radically different in approach from the ‘modern mind,’ and already 
viewing the ‘obvious’ notion of Reality previously held as something 
antiquated and alien” (p. 81). I suggest Adler and his Individual 
Psychology is an example of this new radically different mind that attempts 
to understand experience without the assistance of previously held 
notions. In short, I suggest that Adler is a phenomenological thinker. 
Further, Lowe (1982) observes: “We are so accustomed to philosophizing 
from an extrinsic standpoint, whether Cartesian or Platonic, that we can 
no longer comprehend the phenomenological standpoint within the world” 
(p. 165). Adler's Individual Psychology helps us to de-familiarize ourselves 
with Cartesian and Platonic thought forms and introduces a 
phenomenological approach. 
  
In classical thinking, theoretical questions and answers are governed by 
a fixed idea of nature. Moreover, truth expressed in theoretical terms has 
become fixed in a particular form of expression that itself is perceived to 
be as valid as the truth. Researchers, not aware of this aberration whereby 
the means have become idealized ends (goals), make interpretive 
mistakes. Adler's Individual Psychology presents a philosophical solution. 
Adler's phenomenological “non-fixity” in understanding helps us avoid the 
interpretive mistakes of idealistic philosophers. In phenomenological 
interpretation, existence is understood as becoming, unity is understood 
as relational and necessity is replaced by option. These notions are easily 
recognizable in Adler's Individual Psychology. 
  
As Western culture continues to evolve, traditional conceptualisation 
becomes increasingly less helpful. Skolimowski (1973), after an expose 
of the limitations of conventional descriptions, offers his understanding of 
a new knowledge. He discusses phenomenological knowledge. “What we 
are seeking, without perhaps being fully aware of it, is not so much 
improved science, or more science, but a different idiom for living, a 
different idiom for our interaction with nature and cosmos” (p. 36). 
 Phenomenological thinking, which is existential understanding about 
human experience, underscores Adler's thought. Contemporary thinking 
has developed independently and, in many cases, in opposition to 
classical philosophy and theology (Kroner, 1951). Development is 
continually taking place, and the Western hermeneutic is seeking to end 
its “cultural provincialism” and provide a new threshold of interpretation 
(Tracy, 1988, p. 56). In short, we cannot live with fossilized thresholds. 
Adler’s Individual Psychology assists in ending this “cultural 
provincialism.” 
  
Theoretical scientific understanding originated with the philosophers who 
lived prior to Plato and Aristotle. They prepared the way for 
phenomenological interpretation. Murray (1940) writes: 
The early philosophers of the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. were more like 
men of science with a strong taste for generalization. Their problems were 
concerned with the physical world: they made researches in geometry, 
geography, medicine, astronomy, natural history and were apt to sum up 
their conclusions in sweeping apothegms….. Socrates, the father of the 
Attic school of philosophy, turning away from natural science with its crude 
generalizations, concentrated his attention on man, and particularly on the 
analysis of ordinary speech and current ideas (p. 36). 
  
Adler also “concentrated his attention on man” in his Individual Psychology 
which is articulated by way of a phenomenological approach to life. Adler's 
Individual Psychology constructs eidetic objects. Eidetic objects have no 
extra-mental existence, ideal or otherwise (Ryba, 1991). These fictions, or 
eidetic notions, evoke a movement in an individual that is capable of study 
according to Adler's Individual Psychology. 
  
Traditional Western analytical interpretation maintains that there must be 
some cause existing independently behind all effects. Discussing modern 
developments in the cognitive sciences, Searle (1984) points out an 
assumption within rationalist thinking which many find no longer tests as 
true. This assumption “goes as far back as Leibnitz and probably as far as 
Plato. It is the assumption that a mental achievement must have 
theoretical causes” (p. 45). However, this is not so with Adler's Individual 
Psychology. Adler does not rely on classical understanding. Rather, 
Adler's phenomenological interpretation suggests a direction in which 
human development may occur. 
  
Since Adler's thinking is not determined by pre-existing theoretical causes 
it presents as a new threshold of understanding. Individual Psychology, 
as a phenomenological methodology, possesses no past or future that 
concretely exists; there is only the perpetual present moment of existence 
that is susceptible to interpretation. However, the present moment 
(movement) is not divorced from the past but, rather, has evolved from it 
(Sokolowski, 1974). Bloom (1987) cites such evolutionary development in 
Descartes' thought: "Descartes had a whole wonderful world of old beliefs, 
of prescientific experience and articulations of the order of things, beliefs 
firmly and evenly fanatically held, before he even began his systematic 
and radical doubt" (p. 42). 
  
As well, Bloom (1987) notes that Heidegger turned to pre-Socratic thought 
forms in developing his ideas. 
  
A new beginning was imperative, and he turned with open mind to the 
ancients. But he did not focus on Plato or Aristotle.... Heidegger was 
drawn instead to the pre-Socratic philosophers, from whom he hoped to 
discover another understanding of being to help him replace the 
exhausted one inherited from Plato and Aristotle, which he and Nietzsche 
thought to be at the root of both Christianity and modem science (p. 310). 
  
According to Ferguson (1992), Stephen Hawking thinks similarly. He 
“doesn't hesitate to admit that an earlier conclusion was incorrect or 
incomplete. That's the way his science–and perhaps all good science–
advances, and one of the reasons why physics seems so full of 
paradoxes” (p. 122). 
  
Finally, Dewart (1989) notes a similar evolutionary development occurring 
in phenomenological thinking. He writes: “The phenomenological 
method...is not the diametric opposite of the ontological; it is a more 
comprehensive one than the latter, whose merits it preserves and whose 
inadequacies it tries to remedy” (p. 31). Adler's Individual psychology is a 
phenomenological undertaking which returns to the individual’s 
experience in much the same manner as Heidegger returned to the pre-
Socratic philosophers. 
  
Phenomenological Thresholds in Adler's Individual Psychology 
  
Specifically, in his Individual Psychology, Adler moved towards 
phenomenology in two important ways: first, in Individual Psychology, the 
idea of a fixed, objective interpretation of events moves to that of continual 
interpretation; second, a classical epistemology of knowing moves to a 
phenomenology of being. 
  
Fixed interpretation moves to continual interpretation 
  
To engage in phenomenological interpretation is a challenging task. Don 
Ihde (1977) offers advice that applies to Adler’s Individual Psychology. 
  
When one first learns a discipline, one must also learn a ‘tribal language.’ 
In philosophy, those who read Kant for the first time, or Leibnitz, or even 
Nietzsche, may find words being used in a different and often technical 
way.... But if a discipline is to be mastered, the technical language simply 
must be learned. That is as true of sciences, logic, alternate styles of 
philosophy as it is of phenomenology (p. 19). 
  
The present movement from fixed to continual interpretation within 
Western theological thinking arises partly from the attempts at reconciling 
contemporary interpretation and traditional understanding. Adler’s 
Individual Psychology is an example of this shift occurring in psychology. 
  
Tamas (1991), referring to postmodern development, suggests that an 
additional evolutionary phase of understanding is “bringing a new form of 
civilization and a new world view with principles and ideals fundamentally 
different from those that have impelled the modem world through its 
dramatic trajectory” (p. 410). Adler's Individual Psychology is all about 
inclusion in this new dramatic trajectory. 
  
Kant’s creative thinking introduced a new philosophical understanding 
about intelligible categories. They exist but are not perceptible. This notion 
is reflected within Adler’s Individual Psychology. A phenomenological 
threshold does disclose something new; it does not simply present 
variations of previous interpretation. What is new is the interpretation of 
existing, non-perceptible relationships. New methods of interpretation are 
conceived and new questions requiring further innovative resolutions arise 
in Adler’s Individual Psychology. 
  
Specific cultures provide a threshold of interpretation in which 
phenomenological understanding is continually constructed and 
reconstructed. History shows that those thresholds that die out have not 
exhausted their meaning. Rather, other thresholds, which are more 
suitably adapted to a specific cultural understanding, have become 
accepted. Young (1988) shows how culturally suitable ones have replaced 
unsuitable psychotherapeutic methodologies in Western culture. Adler’s 
Individual Psychology can be classed among the culturally suitable ones. 
  
A classical epistemology of knowing moves to a phenomenology of 
being 
  
As the scholastic thinker requires a secure grasp of idealistic thought and 
presumptions, so the phenomenological thinker requires a secure grasp 
of phenomenological understanding and presumptions. Two 
phenomenological philosophical presumptions contributing to this essay 
are that: 
  
• knowing is actualised in existential consciousness. It is not an act of 
intellectual apprehension of theoretical structures. 
  
• unity is actualised in a conscious awareness of dialectical relationships 
rather than through an intellectual conformation to ideal categories. 
  
Both presumptions are evident within Adler’s Individual Psychology. 
  
Classical knowledge is structured upon theoretical concepts which 
themselves are structured upon previous concepts (Hodges, 1979; Watts 
& Williams, 1988). Classical knowledge consists of theoretical 
interpretations, which are theoretical interpretations of theoretical 
interpretations ad infinitum. Phenomenological knowledge differs from 
classical knowledge in that conscious (intended) understanding is 
constituted out of the present moment of being (existence). Noetic 
concepts are not revisions or refinements of ideal concepts but are 
actualisations of the present moment of being. The old schema of 
theoretical knowledge is not perpetuated nor preserved in a 
phenomenological epistemology. Within this line of thought, Von 
Bertalanffy’s discussion of the re-orientation to systems thought, a 
movement from idealistic thinking to noetic thinking, continues Adler’s 
approach within Individual Psychology. Von Bertalanffy (1968) writes: 
  
Such a new ‘image of man,’ replacing the robot concept by that of system, 
emphasizing immanent activity instead of outer-directed activity ... should 
lead to a basic reevaluation of problems of education, training, 
psychotherapy and human attitudes in general (p. 194). 
  
Adler’s Individual Psychology, which constructs (actualises) noetic 
concepts, reveals a phenomenological philosophy that structures new 
thresholds of interpretation. Streng (1991) states: “The act of giving value 
is perceived as an ontological act because it determines the manner in 
which one recognizes and thereby ‘actualizes’ one’s existence” (p. 8). This 
is the basis of Adler’s Individual Psychology. 
  
The phenomenological view does not necessarily conform to with any 
given system of knowledge. In a phenomenology of being, the boundaries 
of a relational state are not fixed. In a phenomenology of being one must 
think in terms of subjectivity and objectivity rather than in terms of 
subjectivism and objectivism. Subjectivism and objectivism denote a 
specific doctrine or system of knowledge, whereas subjectivity and 
objectivity are notions connoting a phenomenological and personal view 
of the life-world. To exclude subjective understanding and rely only on 
objective (ideal) understanding would be a phenomenological 
philosophical error according to Searle (1984). Because of this subjective 
approach, Darroch and Silvers (1982) suggest that an author’s biography 
be incorporated into any interpretation of experience. Adler’s life 
experience, articulated at the threshold of existentialism, provided the 
context out of which his Individual Psychology developed. 
  
This essay began by situating Adler’s thinking in the philosophical context 
of German existentialism. To close, I quote the opening paragraph of The 
Quest of the Historical Jesus and invite the reader to ponder its content with 
respect to the philosophical context of Adler’s Individual Psychology. 
Schweitzer (1910) writes: 
  
When, at some future day, our period of civilization shall lie, closed and 
completed, before the eyes of later generations, German theology will 
stand out as a great, a unique phenomenon in the mental and spiritual life 
of our time. For nowhere save in the German temperament can there be 
found in the same perfection the living complex of conditions and factors—
of philosophic thought, critical acumen, historical insight, and religious 
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